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Languages and Earnings Management 
1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate how languages are associated with earnings management in 
different countries. Languages differ in the way they encode time.1 Following the linguistics 
literature, we separate languages into two types based on the way they encode time: strong future-
time reference (FTR) languages, such as English, and weak FTR languages, such as German. 
Strong FTR languages require speakers to mark the timing of events in a distinct way, whereas 
weak FTR languages do not. In a weak FTR language, future events are talked about in the present 
tense. This may lead these speakers to perceive future events to be relatively less distant. 
According to Dahl (2000) and Thieroff (2000), marking future events mandatorily through future 
tense, for example, by using the verb “will” in English, reduces a person’s concern about the future, 
because it increases the psychological distance from and reduces the psychological importance of 
the future.  
Consistent with this argument, Chen (2013) finds that when the grammatical structure of a 
language disassociates the future from the present, speakers of the language also disassociate the 
future from the present in their behavior. Specifically, Chen (2013) shows that people whose 
language does not require them to grammatically mark future events (weak FTR languages) save 
more than those whose language requires them to grammatically mark future events (strong FTR 
languages). He also shows that people speaking weak FTR languages engage in more future-
oriented behavior, such as more exercise and less smoking, than those speaking strong FTR 
1 The following example is from Chen (2013). “For example, a German speaker predicting rain can naturally do so 
in the present tense, saying: Morgen regnet es which translates to ‘It rains tomorrow’. In contrast, English would 
require the use of a future marker like ‘will’ or ‘is going to’, as in: ‘It will rain tomorrow’.” German is denoted as a 
weak future-time reference (FTR) language, because it does not require speakers to encode a distinction between 
present and future events. 
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languages. Given that weak FTR languages reduce psychological distance from the future (Dahl, 
2000; Thieroff, 2000), managers in countries with weak FTR languages are likely to perceive 
future consequences of earnings management, such as possible restatements, enforcement actions, 
litigations, and dismissals, to be more imminent. Thus, we argue that firms in countries with weak 
FTR languages are likely to engage in less earnings management than firms in countries with 
strong FTR languages. 
Using a large sample of firms from 38 countries, we examine whether accrual-based and 
real earnings management are more or less prevalent in countries with weak FTR languages than 
in countries with strong FTR languages. After controlling for various properties of formal 
institutions (legal origin, economic growth, ownership concentration, and creditor rights) and 
country-specific cultural characteristics (uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, individualism, and 
power distance), we show that firms associated with weak FTR languages engage in less accrual-
based and real earnings management than firms in countries with strong FTR languages. Through 
country-level regressions, we also show that weak FTR languages are associated with more 
extensive external equity markets and less earnings management aggregated at the country level. 
Although we control for various country-specific characteristics, our regressions are 
fundamentally cross-country and may omit important differences between countries not captured 
by these controls. To further isolate linguistic effects from confounds that vary on the country 
level, such as taxes, institutions, and capital markets, we also conduct a within-country analysis 
based on the birthplace information of U.S. firms’ CEOs. We code the languages by foreign-born 
CEOs’ countries of origin. Because we focus on U.S. firms only, we are able to control for the 
effects of formal institutions which differ across countries. Fernández (2011) suggests that when 
individuals emigrate from their native country to a new country, their cultural beliefs and values 
3 
 
travel with them, but their external economic and institutional environments are left behind. We 
find that CEOs born in countries with weak FTR languages engage in less earnings management 
than CEOs born in countries with strong FTR languages, confirming our results in cross-country 
regressions.  
Our results are robust to excluding U.S. firms and to excluding firms in Belgium and 
Singapore, where a significant percentage of population uses different languages. Our results are 
also robust when we replace a dichotomous classification of FTR in languages with continuous 
measures based on a word-frequency analysis of online texts. Additional controls for cross-country 
differences in insider trading restrictions and compliance between financial and tax reporting do 
not change the tenor of the results. We further find that the negative relation between weak FTR 
languages and accrual-based earnings management is less pronounced for firms that issue 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), suggesting that international exposure attenuates the 
relation between languages and earnings management. 
Linguistically induced bias in time perception and lower precision of beliefs about time 
can lead weak FTR speakers to apply lower discount rates (Chen, 2013), making future cash flows 
and earnings relatively more valuable to weak FTR speakers than to strong FTR speakers. Under 
this scenario, weak FTR speakers are less likely to undertake income-increasing earnings 
management that shifts earnings from the future to the present, but could engage in more earnings 
management that shifts earnings from present to future periods. Concerns about the future negative 
consequences of earnings management, however, encourage weak FTR speakers to avoid both 
income-creasing and income-decreasing earnings management. Our evidence shows that both 
income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management are negatively associated with 
weak FTR languages, suggesting that concerns about future negative consequences of earnings 
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management dominate the discount rate effect.  
Our study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to 
the emerging literature that examines the effects of informal institutions on corporate behavior. 
Although studies that examine the effects of formal institutions on corporate policies are abundant, 
evidence on the effects of informal institutions, such as culture, values, and religion, is relatively 
scarce. Prior studies that investigate the effects of informal institutions focus on religion (e.g., 
McGuire et al., 2012) and culture (e.g., Han et al., 2010). Our study is the first to show the 
systematic relation between languages and earnings management.  
Second, our study is the first to combine accounting and the grammatical structure of 
languages, more specifically, how languages mark time, and attempt to build a link between 
languages and cross-country variances in earnings management. A few recent studies examine the 
relation between linguistic complexity and disclosure. Lundholm et al. (2014), for example, find 
that foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges write clearer text in the Management Discussion 
and Analysis section of their 10-Ks and write more readable text in their earnings press releases 
than do comparable U.S. firms. Brochet et al. (2016) find a negative relation between linguistic 
opacity and the investor reaction to conference calls. While these studies focus on how linguistic 
complexity associates managerial choice of and investors’ reactions to disclosure, we add to the 
literature by examining how the grammatical structure of languages relates to financial reporting 
characteristics.  
Finally, by identifying an important non-market factor that is significantly associated with 
both accrual-based and real earnings management, we also contribute to the earnings management 




The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review 
and hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses the data and research design. We present the 
results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
   
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Compared with other creatures, human beings at birth are not properly equipped for 
survival. During their first ten to twelve years, however, they begin to learn how to live, absorbing 
necessary information from their environment through language (Hofstede et al., 2010). Language 
is an element that influences human beings earlier than any other societal elements, such as religion, 
culture, and formal institutions. Given this, language could have a considerable effect on human 
behavior. 
Languages differ as to how they mark future events. English marks the future with either “will” 
or “be going to.” Kalaallisut (West Greenlandic) has at least 28 distinct constructions to mark future 
time. In contrast, Finnish rarely distinguishes between present and future time. Languages also differ 
as to when they mark future events. Jakobson and Halle (1956) note that “languages differ essentially 
in what they must convey and not in what they may convey.” Weak future time reference (FTR) and 
strong FTR are differentiated by the obligatory marking of future events (Thieroff, 2000). Germanic 
languages, except for English, make grammatical FTR optional in making predictions. According to 
Comrie (1985), in English, sentences describing future events without FTR can be used only for 
planned/scheduled/habitual events or for events with law-like properties of the world, whereas in 
German, sentences describing future events without FTR are common. 
The linguistic relativity principle, or the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, is the idea that 
differences in the way languages encode cultural and cognitive categories affect the way people 
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think, so that speakers of different languages will tend to think and behave differently depending 
on the languages they use (Whorf, 1956). Chen (2013) shows that speakers of weak FTR languages 
tend to engage in more future-oriented behavior. Such speakers tend to save more, exercise more, 
and smoke less than those who speak strong FTR languages. In a controlled intertemporal choice 
experiment using German-speaking and Italian-speaking primary school children in a northern 
Italian city in which half of the inhabitants speak German, and the other half speak Italian, Sutter 
et al. (2015) find strong differences in the intertemporal choices of the two groups of children. 
More specifically, weak FTR German-speaking primary school children are about 46% more likely 
than strong FTR Italian-speaking children to delay gratification. These differences persist even 
when they control for personal characteristics and family background, which provides further 
support for Chen (2013). 
Although Chen (2013) and Sutter et al. (2015) show the effect of FTR languages on 
individuals’ economic behavior, little evidence exists on the relation between languages and 
corporate policies. Liang et al. (2014) find that firms in countries with weak FTR languages show 
a higher level of corporate social responsibility than those with strong FTR languages. Chen et al. 
(2015) hypothesize that speaking about future events in the present tense leads firms to perceive 
future events of relevance for corporate behavior, such as adverse credit market conditions, to be 
less distant. Consistent with this argument, they find that firms in weak-FTR language countries 
have higher cash holdings for reasons not attributable to industry, firm, or country characteristics.2  
Given that speakers of weak FTR languages show more future-oriented behavior (Chen, 
2013; Liang et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Sutter et al., 2015), we predict that firms in countries 
with weak FTR languages are likely to engage in less earnings management than firms in countries 
                                           
2 Ellahie et al. (2016) find that FTR also influences preferences regarding monetary rewards. Specifically, they 
document that top executives whose linguistic origin has strong FTR prefer variable pay. 
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with strong FTR languages. Weak FTR speakers would care more about future consequences of 
earnings management, compared to strong FTR speakers. Dhal (2000) and Thieroff (2000) suggest 
that weak FTR language reduces psychological distance from the future.  
Earnings management often leads to negative future consequences in the form of 
restatements, enforcement actions, litigations, and/or dismissals of executives. Earnings 
management is likely to be subject to the regulatory enforcement, such as accounting and auditing 
enforcement releases (AAER) or restatements. Managers misstating earnings are also likely to 
encounter legal troubles. Karpoff et al. (2008) find that 93% of the responsible individuals in 
AAER firms leave the firms by the end of the enforcement period and suffer serious legal penalties 
and monetary losses. Desai et al. (2006) report that restatement firms have higher management 
turnover and that the management of restatement firms experiences difficulties in finding 
subsequent employment. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) demonstrate that 38% of restatement firms 
are subject to litigation against not only the company, but also the management, directors, and 
auditors.  
Compared to strong FTR speakers, weak FTR speakers are likely to perceive future 
negative consequences of earnings management to be more imminent, as their languages do not 
sharply disassociate the future from the present, and therefore, they are likely to engage in less 
earnings management. Thus, we expect a negative relation between weak FTR languages and 
accrual-based earnings management. We state our first hypothesis in an alternative form:  
H1: Firms in countries with weak FTR languages engage in less accrual-based earnings 
management than those in countries with strong FTR languages. 
 
Managers exercise discretion not only via their choice of accounting estimates and methods; 
i.e., accrual-based earnings management, but also through operational decisions (real earnings 
management). Survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) suggests that managers prefer real earnings 
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management to accrual-based earnings management, because auditors or regulators cannot 
challenge real economic actions to meet earnings targets. Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) note that real earnings management is less likely to draw auditors’ or regulators’ 
scrutiny than accrual-based earnings management. Roychowdhury (2006), however, suggests that 
firm value can diminish through manipulation of real activities, because earnings management 
through sub-optimal operating decisions can have a negative impact on future cash flows. Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) find that the impact of real earnings management on subsequent operating 
performance is more severe than the impact of accrual-based earnings management in the seasoned 
equity offering context. 
Given that the negative impact of real earnings management in the current period is 
deferred into the future periods and speakers of weak FTR languages are associated with more 
future-oriented behavior (Chen, 2013; Liang et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Sutter et al., 2015), we 
predict that firms in countries with weak FTR languages are likely to engage in less real earnings 
management. Our second hypothesis, stated in an alternative form, is as follows:  
H2: Firms in countries with weak FTR languages engage in less real earnings management 
than those in countries with strong FTR languages. 
 
 
3. Data and research design 
3.1. Sample and data 
We obtain data on FTR of each language from the European Science Foundation’s 
Typology of Languages in Europe (EUROTYP) project (Chen, 2013). Future-time reference is a 
focal area of the EUROTYP Theme Group on Tense and Aspect, which studies the typological 
and areal distribution of grammaticalized FTR. Chen (2013) notes that the EUROTYP project is 
the most extensive typological program to study the cross-linguistic grammaticalization of FTR. 
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Weak-FTR languages are those that do not require the marking of future-time in prediction-based 
contexts, and strong-FTR languages are those that require the marking of future time in all but a 
small set of circumstances. Appendix A shows the distribution of weak and strong FTR languages 
across countries. In our sensitivity analysis, we also employ online-text based coding of FTR used 
in Chen (2013). Chen (2013) constructs two measures of FTR in each language based on a word-
frequency analysis of text of weather forecasts retrieved from the web. The sentence ratio (verb 
ratio) is calculated as the number of sentences (verbs) that are grammatically future-marked, 
divided by the total number of sentences (verbs) regarding weather forecasts.  
We collect firm-level financial data from Compustat North America and Compustat Global 
over the 2002-2011 period. The sample represents all firms covered by Compustat North America and 
Compustat Global with the necessary data for the empirical analyses. We require firm-year 
observations to have the necessary data to calculate abnormal accruals, abnormal operating cash flows, 
and firm-level control variables. We exclude firms in the financial industry and firms in a country with 
fewer than 50 firm-year observations. We obtain country-level variables that represent formal 
institutions and national culture from La Porta et al. (1998), World Bank, Hofstede (2001), Denis and 
Xu (2013), and Blaylock et al. (2015).  
Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country. The final sample consists of 132,909 
firm-year observations across 38 countries. The US has the most firm-year observations, with 
30,133 observations (about 22.67% of the sample). Japan, India, and Taiwan provide the next three 
largest numbers of sample observations, with 20,871, 13,390, and 8,036, respectively. Colombia 
has the fewest observations, with 98. 
Insert Table 1 Here 
3.2. Research design 
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To obtain an empirical measure of accrual-based earnings management, we employ the 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals model, following Kothari et al. (2005). To estimate 
the discretionary component of accruals for any given set of country–year observations, we first 





















+	,      (1) 
TACC: total accruals, equal to net income minus operating cash flows 
TA: total assets 
∆: change in sales 
∆ : change in accounts receivable 
PPE: property, plant, and equipment 
NI: net income 
 
The residual from this model is discretionary accruals (DA). We use the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDA) for our main analyses, as earnings management can involve either 
income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals (Klein, 2002). Considering the possibility that 
FTR languages have an asymmetric effect on accrual-based earnings management, however, we 
also examine income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals separately, by 
dividing the sample into firms with positive discretionary accruals and those with negative 
discretionary accruals. 
To test H1, we estimate the following regression:   
ABSDAi,t  =  α0 + α1 Weak FTR + α2 CONTROLi,t + η1 Dindustry + η2 Dyear + εi,t    (2) 
where ABSDA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals and Weak FTR is an indicator variable 
equal to one for countries with weak FTR languages, and zero otherwise.  
We include various country- and firm-level control variables to isolate linguistic effects 
                                           
3 The underlying assumption of the cross-country design is that partitioning the data based on country allows for inter-
country heterogeneity and intra-country homogeneity in fundamental performance. 
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from confounding factors that may affect earnings management. We control for legal origin 
(Common Law), because common law countries exhibit a higher level of shareholder protection 
and greater shareholder protection may deter earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). We also 
control for creditor rights (Creditor Right) for a similar reason. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show 
that active monitoring arising from ownership concentration deters managers from indulging in 
value-destroying activities. Thus, we control for ownership concentration (Ownership 
Concentration). We include GDP growth (GDP Growth) in the model to control for the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on earnings management. In addition to formal institutions that 
represent law, regulations, and market conditions, because Han et al. (2010) show that national 
culture affects earnings management, we also control for various dimensions of national culture, 
such as uncertainty avoidance (Uncertainty Avoidance), masculinity (Masculinity), individualism 
(Individualism), and power distance (Power Distance). 
We also include firm-level control variables that are known to be related to earnings 
management. Specifically, we control for the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), because large 
firms tend to engage in less earnings management as a large number of investors and analysts 
monitor larger firms more closely (Lobo and Zhou, 2001). We control for leverage (Leverage), 
because DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) show that companies tend to manage 
earnings to avoid debt covenant violations. We include cash flows from operations deflated by sales 
(CFO), because Becker et al. (1998) show that operating cash flows are negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. To control for the potential effect of financial performance (McNichols, 2000; 
Kothari et al., 2005), we include return on assets (ROA) and an indicator for loss firms (Loss). Finally, 
we include industry and year fixed effects to control for heterogeneity across industries and time. We 
provide variable definitions in Appendix B. 
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Following prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; McGuire et al. 2012), we use abnormal cash flows to proxy for real earnings management. 
As in other studies, we decompose the operating cash flows into normal and abnormal portions by 
estimating the following equation for each country and year:4 
!",
##$#,









 + ,	     (3) 
CFO: cash flows from operations 
Assets: total assets 
Sales: sales 
∆)*+,-: change in sales 
 
The residual from this regression is abnormal cash flows from operations (RCFO). 
Acceleration of the timing of sales and/or generation of additional unsustainable sales through 
increased price discounts or more lenient credit terms will lead to lower current-period operating 
cash flows, resulting in abnormally lower operating cash flows. Instead, managers may reduce 
discretionary expenditures such as R&D, advertising, and maintenance to increase current period 
earnings. Reductions of discretionary expenditures will lower cash outflows, resulting in abnormally 
higher operating cash flows. Regardless of the direction, a deviation from optimal operating 
decisions will lead to negative future consequences. Considering both negative and positive 
deviations from the predicted level of operating cash flows, we use the absolute value of abnormal 
cash flows from operations in our main analysis. We also examine negative and positive deviations 
separately by dividing the sample into firms with negative abnormal cash flows from operations and 
those with positive abnormal cash flows from operations.    
To test H2, we estimate the following regression:   
                                           
4 Our results using regressions of accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management estimated at the 
country-industry-year level are qualitatively the same as those tabulated. 
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ABSRCFOi,t  =  λ0 + λ1 Weak FTR + λ2 CONTROLi,t + θ1 Dindustry + θ2 Dyear + εi,t    (4) 
where ABSRCFO is the absolute value of abnormal cash flows from operations and Weak FTR is 
an indicator variable equal to one for countries with weak FTR languages, and zero otherwise. 
Control variables are defined earlier.   
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. We 
winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to mitigate the 
influence of outliers. The mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA) 
are 0.0808 and 0.0478, respectively, which are comparable to those reported in prior studies (e.g., 
Xie 2001; Han et al. 2010). The mean and median of the absolute value of abnormal cash flows 
from operations (ABSRCFO) are 0.1035 and 0.0610, respectively. The mean of Weak FTR is 
0.4184, suggesting that 41.84% of firm-year observations are from countries with weak FTR 
languages. 61% of firm year observations are from common law countries. The mean (median) 
ownership concentration is 27% (20%). As to firm-level variables, the mean and median firm size 
are 7.1437 and 7.0658, respectively. The average leverage ratio is 61%. The mean values of 
operating cash flows and return on assets are negative, while their median values are positive. 
About 28% of firm-year observations experience losses. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations among the dependent and independent variables. 
Most correlations are significant at the 1% level. The correlation between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (ABSDA) and Weak FTR is -0.1116, which provides preliminary support for 
H1 that firms in weak FTR countries engage in less accrual-based earning management. The 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA) is positively correlated with Common Law, 
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Ownership Concentration, GDP Growth, and Individualism. ABSDA is negatively associated with 
Creditor Right, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, and Power Distance. As far as the firm-level 
variables are concerned, Size, CFO, and ROA are negatively correlated with ABSDA, and Leverage 
and Loss are positively correlated with ABSDA. 
The correlation between ABSRCFO and Weak FTR is -0.1688, which provides preliminary 
support for H2 that firms in weak FTR countries engage in less real earnings management. 
ABSRCFO is positively correlated with Common Law, Ownership Concentration, GDP Growth, 
Individualism, Leverage, and Loss and negatively associated with Creditor Right, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Masculinity, Power Distance, Size, CFO, and ROA. 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. FTR of languages and earnings management 
Table 4 presents the result from estimating equation (2), which links accrual-based earnings 
management and the FTR of languages, as well as the result from estimating equation (4), which 
links real earnings management and the FTR of languages. We cluster standard errors by country 
in these regressions and other cross-country regressions. In the first column, where the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA), Weak FTR is negatively related 
to ABSDA at the 1% significance level, suggesting that firms in countries with weak FTR languages 
engage in less accrual-based earnings management than those in countries with strong FTR 
languages. This result supports H1. Considering that the sample mean of ABSDA is 8.1% of total 
assets, the coefficient of -0.0195 translates into a 24.1% decrease in the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals for firms in countries with weak FTR languages, which is economically 
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significant. Among the control variables, ownership concentration is significantly negatively 
related to the absolute value of discretionary accruals, which is consistent with Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1986) finding that greater ownership concentration in firms often prevents managers 
from indulging in value-destroying activities due to active monitoring by these investors. ABSDA 
is positively associated with GDP Growth at the 1% significance level. Firms in countries 
characterized as having higher levels of uncertainty avoidance, individualism, or power distance 
engage in less earnings management, while firms in countries with higher levels of masculinity 
engage in more earnings management. As far as the firm-level control variables are concerned, 
firms with larger size, lower leverage, higher cash flows, and greater profitability manage earnings 
less through discretionary accruals, which is consistent with findings in prior studies.5 
In the second column, where the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal cash 
flows from operations (ABSRCFO), we find that Weak FTR is negatively related to ABSRCFO at the 
1% significance level.6 This result is consistent with H2 that firms in countries with weak FTR 
languages engage in less real earnings management than those in countries with strong FTR 
languages. The difference in ABSRCFO between firms in countries with weak and strong FTR 
languages is about 2% of total assets, which is economically meaningful, given that the sample mean 
of ABSRCFO is 10.4% of total assets. ABSRCFO is negatively associated with Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Individualism, Power Distance, Size, CFO, ROA and Loss, and positively associated with 
Leverage. In summary, the results in Table 4 suggest that firms in countries with weak FTR 
languages manage earnings less through accruals and real operating activities than firms in countries 
                                           
5 We check for potential multicollinearity issues in our regressions. The largest Variance Inflation Factor is 6.18 in our 
regressions, well below the commonly accepted threshold level of 10 for severe multicollinearity. 
6 The number of firm-year observations used for the analysis of abnormal cash flows from operations is slightly larger 




with strong FTR languages. 
Insert Table 4 Here 
4.2. Reconciliation with country-level evidence in prior studies  
In this section, we examine whether our results are robust to country-level regressions similar 
to those in Leuz et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1997). Leuz et al. (2003) calculate an aggregate 
measure of earnings management in each country by averaging ranks across four earnings 
management measures: (1) the median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of operating 
income and operating cash flow, both scaled by lagged total assets; (2) the Spearman correlation 
between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, both scaled by lagged 
total assets; (3) the median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash 
flow from operations; and (4) the number of “small profits” divided by the number of “small losses” 
for each country. They find that the aggregate earnings management measure is negatively associated 
with the Anti-director Rights Index and legal enforcement. We regress the aggregate earnings 
management measure on weak FTR and other country-level controls, including various formal and 
informal institutions, as in Table 4. We also control for the Anti-director Rights Index and legal 
enforcement. The number of countries included in this analysis is 28, for which aggregate earnings 
management measures are available from Leuz et al. (2003). The results are reported in the first 
column of Table 5. As shown, the coefficient on Weak FTR is negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with the results in Table 4. That is, weak FTR languages are associated with a lower level 
of earnings management.7 
                                           
7 We also control for anti-director rights and legal enforcement in our firm-level regressions. In untabulated results, 
the negative relation between weak FTR languages and earnings management remains significant, even with 
additional controls for anti-director rights and legal enforcement. We do not include anti-director rights and legal 
enforcement in our main regressions because a high correlation between the Anti-director Index and the common law 
indicator (0.66) leads to multicollinearity concerns.  
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Insert Table 5 Here 
Our findings suggest that firms in countries with strong FTR languages, such as the US, 
are on average more short-term oriented and engage in more earnings management than firms in 
countries with weak FTR languages. An attentive reader may ask how the results reconcile with 
the fact that English-speaking countries, such as the US and the UK, have more highly valued 
firms and that these firms exhibit much better performance than those in other countries. 8 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003), for example, find that the U.S. economy and stock market perform 
well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries, over the past two decades. 
La Porta et al. (1997) examine the relation between each country’s capital market size and 
the character of legal rules and enforcement. They show that the capital market is larger in 
countries with stronger investor protection. Our results suggest that weak FTR is associated with 
less earnings management. More transparent financial reporting should lead to a more active 
external equity market. Although anecdotal evidence suggests that English-speaking countries 
(e.g., the US and the UK) have larger capital markets and weak FTR countries (e.g., Germany) 
have relatively smaller equity markets, not all countries with strong FTR languages have extensive 
equity markets. Leveraging on the country-level regressions, as in La Porta et al. (1997), we 
examine the relation between external market capitalization of equity and FTR languages. 
Specifically, we regress the ratio of externally held market capitalization to gross national product 
(GNP) for 1994, obtained from La Porta et al. (1997), on Weak FTR and country-level controls. 
The second column of Table 5 reports the results. We find that the coefficient on Weak FTR is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that after controlling for other 
                                           
8 We thank the editor for directing our attention to this issue. 
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country-level formal and informal institutions, weak FTR languages are positively associated with 
external equity market development.9 
4.3. Evidence based on the U.S. firm CEOs’ birthplace information 
Although we include various country- and firm-level controls, our regressions are 
fundamentally cross-country and may omit differences among countries not captured by these 
controls. To further isolate linguistic effects from confounds that vary on the country level, such as 
taxes, capital markets, and other institutions, we implement a within-country analysis based on the 
birthplace data of U.S. firms’ CEOs. Fernández (2011) suggests that when individuals emigrate from 
their native country to a new country, they leave their economic and institutional environment behind. 
Thus, by focusing on foreign-born U.S. firms’ CEOs, we can isolate the effect of language from the 
effect of institutions in the CEOs’ home countries. We search the CEOs from each of the U.S. S&P 
1,500 firms from Marquis Who’s Who and code the languages by foreign-born CEOs’ countries of 
origin. Not all CEOs disclose their birthplace information in Marquis Who’s Who, and we lose a 
significant number of observations for this analysis. The final sample includes 4,781 firm-year 
observations (4,812 observations for the analysis of abnormal cash flows from operations) from 
744 unique firms with CEOs born in 37 different countries.10 
Table 6 presents the results. We include controls for CEO’s gender (Female indicator) and 
age (Age), in addition to firm-level controls. Standard errors are clustered by country of birth. The 
                                           
9 In an alternative specification, we include a set of controls from Table IV of La Porta et al. (1997) in place of the 
formal and informal institutions used in Table 5. The coefficient on Weak FTR remains significantly positive in 
untabulated results. 
10 We also collect data on CEO changes in our sample. Of 4,781 firm-year observations, 363 firm-year observations 
are associated with CEO changes. We drop firm-years if the birthplace information of the departing CEO or the 
incoming CEO is not available from Marquis Who’s Who, which leaves 172 firm-year observations. Of 172 firm-year 
observations, 162 observations involve changes of CEOs from a strong FTR speaker to a strong FTR speaker, 5 involve 
changes of CEOs from strong to weak FTR speakers, and the remaining 5 involve changes of CEOs from weak to 
strong FTR speakers. The number of changes from strong to weak FTR speakers and the number of changes from 
weak to strong FTR speakers are too small to expect meaningful results from an analysis of CEO changes. 
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first column presents the result for accrual-based earnings management, and the second column 
presents the result for real earnings management. We find that both accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management are negatively associated with weak FTR languages, 
confirming the cross-country results in Table 4. Thus, the results in Table 6 further support our 
evidence that weak FTR speakers engage in less earnings management than strong FTR speakers. 
Insert Table 6 Here 
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In this section, we provide several robustness checks of our results by considering alternative 
samples, alternative proxies for FTR languages, additional controls, and the effect of international 
exposure on the relation between FTR languages and earnings management. Panel A of Table 7 
reports the results based on alternative samples. The US accounts for the largest number of 
observations, with 30,133 observations and 22.67% of the sample. To ensure that our results are not 
driven by U.S. firms, we exclude them from the sample and re-estimate the regressions. The results 
in the first two columns of Panel A are qualitatively the same as those in Table 4, suggesting that our 
results are not driven by U.S. firms.  
Belgium has three official languages: Dutch, French, and German. As a first language, Dutch 
(weak FTR) is spoken by about 55% of the population, French (strong FTR) is spoken by about 36% 
of the population, and German (weak FTR) is spoken by about 0.4% of the population. Singapore 
has four official languages: Malay (weak FTR), Chinese (weak FTR), Tamil (strong FTR), and 
English (strong FTR). In each of these countries, the effect of FTR language on earnings 
management is unclear, because both weak and strong FTR languages are spoken within the same 
country.11 Thus, we estimate regressions excluding Belgian and Singaporean firms from the sample 
                                           
11 In our main analyses, Belgium is classified as a weak FTR country because Dutch is the most dominant language; 
Singapore is classified as a weak FTR country because Chinese is spoken by the largest percentage of its residents. 
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and report the results in the last two columns of Panel A. We find that the coefficients on Weak FTR 
are negative and significant in both regressions, confirming that firms in countries with weak FTR 
languages engage in less accrual-based and real earnings management. The coefficients on Weak 
FTR are larger in magnitude than the coefficients in Table 4, suggesting that excluding Belgian and 
Singaporean firms further clarifies the relation between FTR languages and earnings management. 
Thus, we exclude Belgian and Singaporean firms in subsequent sensitivity analyses. 
Our results so far are based on Weak FTR, which is an indicator variable. In Panel B of 
Table 7, we present the results with continuous measures of FTR strength based on word-frequency 
analysis of text retrieved from the web. Chen (2013) calculates the sentence ratio (verb ratio) as 
the number of sentences (verbs) that are grammatically future-marked, divided by the total number 
of sentences (verbs) in online texts of weather forecasts. We multiply the sentence ratio and the 
verb ratio by -1 so that a greater value represents weaker FTR. The first (last) four columns of 
Panel B reports the results based on the sentence ratio (verb ratio). We find that the coefficient on 
Sentence Ratio is negative and significant only in the discretionary accruals regression, while the 
coefficient on Sentence Ratio is negative but insignificant at conventional levels in the real 
earnings management regression. We further interact Sentence Ratio with Weak FTR and find that 
the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in both the 
discretionary accruals regression and the real earnings management regression. The sums of the 
coefficient on Sentence Ratio and the coefficient on the interaction term are significant at 
conventional levels. The negative coefficients on the interaction term suggest that the effect of 
Sentence Ratio on earnings management is more pronounced among weak FTR countries. 
The results with Verb Ratio are similar. We find that the coefficient on Verb Ratio is negative 
and significant in the discretionary accruals regression, while the coefficient on Verb Ratio is negative 
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but insignificant at conventional levels in the real earnings management regression. We further interact 
Verb Ratio with Weak FTR and find that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant in both regressions. The sums of the coefficient on Verb Ratio and the 
coefficient on the interaction term are significant at conventional levels in both regressions. The 
negative coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the effect of Verb Ratio on earnings 
management is more pronounced among weak FTR countries. Overall, the results in Panel B suggest 
that our results are robust to alternative measures of FTR languages.12 
Although we include numerous country- and firm-level controls, other factors, such as insider 
trading restrictions and compliance between financial and tax reporting, may influence the relation 
between FTR languages and earnings management. We obtain data on insider trading restrictions in 
each country from Denis and Xu (2013) and book-tax conformity measures from Blaylock et al. (2015). 
Panel C presents the results when we control for insider trading restrictions (Insider Trading Restriction) 
and book-tax conformity (Book-Tax Conformity). Inclusion of Insider Trading Restriction and Book-
Tax Conformity reduces the number of observations to 111,785 firm-years from 25 countries. The 
results in Panel C show that the negative relation between weak FTR languages and earnings 
management is robust to additional controls. 
In Panel D, we examine the effect of international exposure on the association between national 
languages and accrual-based/real earnings management to gain further insights into the role of 
languages. More specifically, we examine whether exposure to English, a strong FTR language, 
weakens the negative relation between weak FTR languages and earnings management. We include in 
the regressions an indicator variable for a foreign firm’s common or ordinary shares being traded as 
ADRs and the interaction of Weak FTR and ADR and report the results in Panel D. In the first column, 
                                           
12 The results are similar if we use normalized decile ranks of Sentence Ratio and Verb Ratio. 
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where the dependent variable is accrual-based earnings management, the coefficient on Weak FTR is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. In the second column, where real earnings management is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on Weak FTR is negative and significant at the 1% level, but the coefficient on 
the interaction term, although it is positive, is statistically insignificant. The positive coefficient on the 
interaction term in the first column suggests that the negative relation between weak FTR language 
and accrual-based earnings management is weaker when firms are exposed to an English-speaking 
environment, consistent with our prediction.13 
Insert Table 7 Here 
4.5. Additional Analyses 
4.5.1. Analyses based on signs of accrual-based and real earnings management 
Chen (2013) suggests that a linguistically induced bias in time perception and the precision 
of beliefs about time lead to differences in economic behavior between weak and strong FTR 
speakers. Weak FTR speakers perceive future events to be less distant, leading to a lower discount 
rate. Weak FTR speakers also hold less precise beliefs about the timing of future events, leading 
to beliefs that are in line with more dispersed distributions. Both lower discount rates and more 
dispersed distributions lead to a higher present value of future cash flows and earnings. In accrual-
based earnings management, managers make inter-temporal choices. Managers make income-
increasing accruals at the expense of future earnings. Income-decreasing accruals shift current 
earnings to future periods. If weak FTR speakers’ biased time perception and weaker precision 
                                           
13 The results are qualitatively the same if we exclude U.S. firms from the sample. The results in Table 7, Panel D 
should be interpreted with caution. At the conceptual level, an ADR firm would behave differently only if it is from a 
weak FTR country. If it is from a strong FTR country, exposure to another strong FTR language would not have a 
significant effect. In fact, the insignificant coefficient on ADR in the accrual-based earnings management regression 
in the first column is consistent with this argument. We thank the referee for this insight. 
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about time lead to higher present values of future cash flows and earnings, these speakers are less 
likely to shift earnings from the future to the present, because future earnings are more valuable to 
them than to strong FTR speakers, suggesting that weak FTR speakers are less likely to make 
income-increasing accrual decisions than strong FTR speakers. According to this argument, weak 
FTR speakers may engage in more earnings management that shifts earnings from present to future 
periods. That is, weak FTR speakers may engage in less income-increasing earnings management, 
but more income-decreasing earnings management. As discussed earlier, however, weak FTR 
speakers might feel that the negative future consequences of earnings management are more 
imminent. Furthermore, if weak FTR speakers do not sharply disassociate the future from the 
present, they are less likely to be motivated to shift earnings between future and present periods to 
begin with. Thus, weak FTR speakers may avoid not only income-increasing earnings 
management but also income-decreasing earnings management.  
To test the opposite predictions about the effect of weak FTR languages on income-
decreasing earnings management, following Cohen et al. (2008) and Kim et al. (2012), we estimate 
equation (2) for firms with income-increasing discretionary accruals and those with income-
decreasing accruals separately. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 8. The first two 
columns of Panel A report the results for firm-year observations with positive and negative 
discretionary accruals, respectively. Because the dependent variable is still the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, the negative coefficient on Weak FTR in the first (second) column suggests 
that firms in countries with weak FTR languages engage in less income-increasing (income-
decreasing) earnings management through accruals. We find that the coefficient on Weak FTR is 
negative and significant at the 1% level in both columns 1 and 2. Thus, the results suggest that 
firms in countries with weak FTR languages engage in less income-increasing and income-
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decreasing earnings management than those in countries with strong FTR languages. 
In the next two columns of Panel A, we report the results for the firm-year observations 
with positive and negative abnormal cash flows from operations separately. As discussed earlier, 
generating additional unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit 
terms leads to abnormally low current-period operating cash flows, while reducing discretionary 
expenditures results in abnormally high operating cash flows. The third and the fourth columns of 
Panel A report the results of estimating equation (4) for firm-year observations with negative 
abnormal operating cash flows and those with positive abnormal operating cash flows, respectively. 
The dependent variable is ABSRCFO in both regressions, and therefore, the negative coefficient 
on Weak FTR in the third (fourth) column suggests that firms in countries with weak FTR 
languages engage in less real earnings management through price discounts or more lenient credit 
terms (through reducing discretionary expenditures). We find that the coefficient on Weak FTR is 
negative and significant at the 1% level in both regressions. 
In an alternative research design, we estimate multinomial logistic regressions to test the 
likelihood that firms in countries with weak FTR languages might be in the extreme DA or RCFO 
quartiles. This specification considers simultaneously, but separately, the likelihood of positive and 
negative discretionary accruals (abnormal cash flows from operations). Firm-year observations in 
the middle two quartiles are classified as the benchmark group. We estimate a model predicting 
the likelihood that a firm will be in the top quartile DA (RCFO) group and a model predicting the 
likelihood that a firm will be in the bottom quartile DA (RCFO) group. The results are reported in 
Table 8, Panel B. As shown in the first (third) column, firms in countries with weak FTR languages 
are less likely than those in countries with strong FTR languages to be in the top DA (RCFO) 
quartile group. Weak FTR firms are also less likely to be in the bottom DA (RCFO) quartile group. 
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These results are consistent with those in Panel A and suggest that weak FTR speakers avoid not 
only income-increasing earnings management but also income-decreasing earnings management. 
It appears that concerns about future negative consequences arising from earnings management 
dominate the effect of differential discount rates that weak and strong FTR speakers apply to future 
earnings and cash flows. 
Insert Table 8 Here 
4.5.2. Timely recognition of economic losses 
Although this paper focuses mainly on the relation between FTR in languages and earnings 
management, we also consider the implications of FTR in languages for accounting conservatism, 
an important attribute of accounting information. We expect weak FTR speakers to accelerate their 
recognition of economic losses more, because they perceive negative consequences of delaying 
losses to be more imminent. To test this prediction, we adopt Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) 
framework and regress changes in earnings in year t (∆NIt) on changes in earnings in year t-1 (∆NIt-
1), an indicator for the negative changes in earnings in year t-1 (D∆NIt-1), and the interaction of 
changes in earnings and the indicator for the negative earnings changes (∆NIt-1* D∆NIt-1). In this 
framework, timely recognition of gains and losses is reflected in the reversal of income increases 
and decreases due to the transitory nature of economic income (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). A 
negative coefficient on the interaction term, ∆NIt-1*D∆NIt-1, suggests that economic losses are 
recognized in a timelier fashion than gains. We interact all variables (i.e., ∆NIt-1, D∆NIt-1, and ∆NIt-
1*D∆NIt-1) with Weak FTR, as well as the country- and firm-level controls. If weak FTR speakers 
recognize economic losses timelier than strong FTR speakers, then the coefficient on the triple 
interaction term, Weak FTR*∆NIt-1*D∆NIt-1, will be significantly negative.  
Table 9 reports the results. The first column reports the results without Weak FTR and 
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control variables. The second column presents the results with control variables as well as their 
interactions with ∆NIt-1, D∆NIt-1, and ∆NIt-1*D∆NIt-1, but without Weak FTR. In both columns the 
coefficient on ∆NIt-1*D∆NIt-1 is negative and significant, confirming accounting conservatism in 
our sample. The third column of Table 9 reports the results from the analysis that examines the 
effect of Weak FTR on accounting conservatism. As predicted, the coefficient on the triple 
interaction is negative and significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient on ∆NIt-1*D∆NIt-1 is 
negative but statistically insignificant. The sum of the coefficient on ∆NIt-1*D∆NIt-1 and the 
coefficient on the triple interaction term, Weak FTR*∆NIt-1* D∆NIt-1, is negative and significant. 
Thus the results suggest that firms in countries with weak FTR languages recognize economic 
losses in a timelier manner than those in countries with strong FTR languages. Conditional 
conservatism limits managers’ incentives and ability to overstate financial statements (Watts 2003). 
Thus, the positive relation between weak FTR languages and timely recognition of economic 
losses is consistent with the negative relation between weak FTR languages and income-increasing 
earnings management.14 We hastily add, however, that our analysis of accounting conservatism is 
exploratory and therefore the results should be interpreted with caution. 
Insert Table 9 Here 
 
5. Conclusion 
Prior studies that examine cross-country variations in earnings management focus on legal 
institutions (Leuz et al., 2003) and informal institutions, such as culture (Han et al., 2010). 
                                           
14 Because conditional conservatism does not necessarily mean income-decreasing earnings management, the results 
in Table 9 are not inconsistent with the negative relation between weak FTR languages and income-decreasing 
earnings management. While income-decreasing earnings management leads to potential restatements, reputation loss, 




Although language is an element that influences human beings earlier than other elements, such 
as culture, religion, and formal institutions, and therefore have considerable effects on human 
behavior (Hofstede et al., 2010), not much is known as to how language relates to financial 
reporting characteristics of firms across countries. 
Languages differ in how they encode time. In strong future time reference (FTR) languages, 
sentences describing future events without FTR are rare. In contrast, weak FTR languages make 
grammatical future-time reference optional. The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis posits that languages 
influence individuals’ thought and behavior. Therefore, languages are likely to impact earnings 
management, through its influence on managers’ behavior and decision-making. Given that weak 
FTR languages reduce individuals’ psychological distance from the future (Dhal, 2000; Thieroff, 
2000), we hypothesize that managers in countries with weak FTR languages perceive future 
negative consequences of earnings management to be more imminent, and therefore engage in less 
earnings management than managers in countries with strong FTR languages. 
This study finds that the way in which languages encode time is significantly associated 
with both accrual-based and real earnings management. More specifically, we show that firms 
associated with weak FTR languages engage in less accrual-based and real earnings management 
than firms associated with strong FTR languages. To further isolate linguistic effects from 
confounds that vary on the country level, we conduct a within-country analysis based on the 
birthplace information of U.S. firms’ CEOs, and find that CEOs born in countries with weak FTR 
languages engage in less earnings management. Our results are robust to alternative samples, 
alternative proxies for FTR languages, and additional controls. We also find some evidence that 
international exposure attenuates the relation between FTR languages and earnings management. 
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In addition, we find that the effect of FTR languages on earnings management extends to 
accounting conservatism. 
Our study contributes to the nascent literature on languages and corporate behavior by 
showing that languages can influence earnings management. Earnings management is an important 
corporate behavior that is widespread among corporations (Graham et al., 2005). Our study 
identifies an important factor that explains cross-sectional variation of earnings management. Our 
study also makes contributions to the literature that examines the effects of informal institutions 
on corporate behavior. Although prior studies examine the effects of culture and religion, our study 
is the first to show the systematic relation between the grammatical structure of languages and 
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Appendix A. FTR languages 
 
  Country Code Country Name  FTR Official  Language 
1 ARG Argentina Strong Spanish  
2 AUS Australia Strong English 
3 AUT Austria Weak German 
4 BEL Belgium Weak Dutch 
5 BRA Brazil Weak Portuguese 
6 CAD Canada Strong English 
7 CHL Chile Strong Spanish  
8 COL Colombia Strong Spanish  
9 DEU Germany Weak German 
10 DNK Denmark Weak Danish 
11 EGY Egypt Strong Arabic 
12 FIN Finland Weak Finnish 
13 FRA France Strong French 
14 GBR United Kingdom Strong English 
15 GRC Greece Strong Greek  
16 HKG Hong Kong Weak Cantonese  
17 IDN Indonesia Weak Indonesian  
18 IND India Strong Hindi 
19 IRL Ireland Strong English 
20 ISR Israel Strong Hebrew 
21 ITA Italy Strong Italian  
22 JPN Japan Weak Japanese 
23 KOR South Korea Strong Korean 
24 MEX Mexico Strong Spanish  
25 MYS Malaysia Weak Malaysian  
26 NLD Netherlands Weak Dutch 
27 NOR Norway Weak Norwegian  
28 NZL New Zealand Strong English 
29 PAK Pakistan Strong Urdu 
30 PER Peru Strong Spanish  
31 PHL Philippines Strong Tagalog 
32 PRT Portugal Strong Portuguese,  
33 SGP Singapore Weak Mandarin  
34 SWE Sweden Weak Swedish 
35 THA Thailand Strong Thai 
36 TUR Turkey Strong Turkish  
37 TWN Taiwan Weak Mandarin 





Appendix B. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Source Definition 
Dependent variables   
ABSDA  
Absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA) estimated 
following Kothari et al. (2005) 




Weak FTR Chen (2013) 
Indicator variable equal to one if a language does not 
differentiate the present and the future obligatorily, and zero 
otherwise 
Common Law  La Porta et al. (1998) 




La Porta et al. (1998) 
Ownership concentration measured as the average percentage 
of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms 
Creditor Right La Porta et al. (1998) Index aggregating different creditor rights 
GDP Growth World Bank  GDP growth rate 
Uncertainty Avoidance Hofstede (2001) Uncertainty avoidance score from Hofstede (2001) 
Masculinity Hofstede (2001) Masculinity score from Hofstede (2001) 
Individualism Hofstede (2001) Individualism score from Hofstede (2001) 




Sentence Ratio Chen (2013) Sentence ratio from Chen (2013) * (-1) 
Verb Ratio Chen (2013) Verb ratio from Chen (2013) * (-1) 
Insider Trading 
Restriction 
Denis and Xu (2013) Insider trading restriction 
Book-Tax Conformity Blaylock et al. (2015) Book tax conformity 
Firm-level variables   
Size Compustat Natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage Compustat Total liabilities deflated by total assets 
CFO Compustat Cash flows from operation deflated by revenue 
ROA Compustat Net income deflated by total assets 
Loss Compustat 







Table 1  
Sample by country 
 
This table presents the sample distribution by country. 
 
Country N Country N 
Argentina 257 Malaysia 5,279 
Australia 6554 Mexico 446 
Austria 365 Netherlands 612 
Belgium 477 New Zealand 534 
Brazil 1113 Norway 782 
Canada 4167 Pakistan 1,009 
Chile 674 Peru 501 
Colombia 98 Philippines 870 
Denmark 527 Portugal 262 
Egypt 112 Singapore 3,658 
Finland 729 South Korea 3,445 
France 3,088 Sweden 1,835 
Germany 3,193 Taiwan 8,036 
Greece 719 Thailand 2,735 
Hong Kong 6,307 Turkey 558 
India 13,390 United Kingdom 6,263 
Indonesia 1,778 United States of America 30,133 
Ireland 228 Total 132,909 
Israel 495   
Italy 809   






Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables used in regressions. 
Descriptive statistics are calculated based on 132,909 firm year observations used in ABSDA regressions 
for all variables except ABSRCFO. The descriptive statistics of ABSRCFO are calculated based on 132,916 










Dependent variables      
ABSDA 0.0808  0.0212  0.0478  0.0954  0.1152  
ABSRCFO 0.1035  0.0270  0.0610  0.1209  0.1471  
Country-level variables      
Weak FTR 0.4184 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4933 
Common Law 0.6113  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.4874  
Ownership Concentration 0.2797  0.1300  0.2000  0.4300  0.1747  
Creditor Right 2.2234  1.0000  2.0000  4.0000  1.2589  
GDP Growth 0.0002  0.0267  0.0552  0.1137  0.0060  
Uncertainty Avoidance 56.2695  40.0000  46.0000  75.0000  22.7658  
Masculinity 59.0970  48.0000  61.0000  62.0000  19.4042  
Individualism 56.5980  26.0000  48.0000  91.0000  27.5912  
Power Distance 56.9453  40.0000  54.0000  68.0000  19.1548  
Firm-level variables      
Size 7.1437  4.9418  7.0658  9.2922  3.1266  
Leverage 0.6140  0.3336  0.5304  0.7251  0.6318  
CFO -0.3712  0.0031  0.0622  0.1364  2.6651  
ROA -0.0439  -0.0122  0.0286  0.0684  0.3876  










Table 3  
Correlations  
 
This table reports Pearson correlations. All correlations are significant at the 1% level except for the correlation between ABSRCFO and GDP 
Growth, which is significant at the 5% level, and the correlation between GDP Growth and Leverage and the correlation between Masculinity and 
ROA, which are not statistically significant. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 









ABSRCFO 0.6597       
Weak FTR -0.1116 -0.1688      
Common Law 0.1422 0.1898 -0.5735     
Ownership Concentration 0.0078 -0.0083 0.1556 0.0775    
Creditor Right -0.0284 -0.0751 0.2514 0.1458 0.5138   
GDP Growth 0.0277 0.0055 -0.0155 0.0250 0.2460 0.1591  
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.1316 -0.1696 0.2485 -0.7640 -0.2585 -0.2963 -0.0556 
Masculinity -0.0684 -0.0863 0.2264 -0.1891 -0.3166 -0.2298 -0.0872 
Individualism 0.0985 0.1804 -0.5693 0.4273 -0.4741 -0.5880 -0.1377 
Power Distance -0.0505 -0.1022 0.1490 0.0611 0.4336 0.6574 0.1536 
Size  -0.2818 -0.3314 0.3322 -0.4948 -0.0549 0.1615 0.0315 
Leverage 0.3805 0.3472 -0.0757 0.0499 -0.0193 -0.0430 -0.0018 
CFO -0.2542 -0.3109 0.1072 -0.1088 0.0403 0.0986 -0.0086 
ROA -0.3641 -0.3812 0.1218 -0.1332 0.0981 0.1372 0.0502 
Loss 0.1925 0.1894 -0.1255 0.1395 -0.0529 -0.1220 -0.0549 
 
 Uncertainty Avoidance Masculinity Individualism Power Distance Size  Leverage CFO ROA 
Masculinity 0.4875        
Individualism -0.2090 0.1058       
Power Distance -0.1802 -0.1993 -0.6303      
Size  0.4695 0.2793 -0.4606 0.1279     
Leverage -0.0343 -0.0075 0.0779 -0.0397 -0.0904    
CFO 0.0696 0.0135 -0.1588 0.1112 0.2605 -0.0759   
ROA 0.0873 -0.0041 -0.2022 0.1396 0.3926 -0.3742 0.4012  




Table 4  
Languages, accrual-based earnings management, and real earnings management 
 
This table presents the results from pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the 
relation between FTR in language and accrual-based earnings management and the relation between FTR 
in language and real earnings management. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are 
clustered by country. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dependent variable = ABSDA ABSRCFO 
   
Weak FTR -0.0195*** -0.0195*** 
 (-4.25) (-3.20) 
Common Law -0.0056 -0.0013 
 (-0.67) (-0.12) 
Ownership Concentration -0.0303** -0.0071 
 (-2.54) (-1.32) 
Creditor Right 0.002 0.0003 
 (1.05) (0.11) 
GDP Growth 0.0471*** 0.0171 
 (2.61) (0.79) 
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0004* -0.0005* 
 (-1.91) (-1.82) 
Masculinity 0.0003** 0.0001 
 (2.36) (0.56) 
Individualism -0.0008*** -0.0005*** 
 (-5.19) (-2.83) 
Power Distance -0.0005*** -0.0007*** 
 (-4.28) (-3.91) 
Size -0.0075*** -0.0088*** 
 (-4.86) (-4.33) 
Leverage 0.0561*** 0.0605*** 
 (13.65) (11.01) 
CFO -0.0050*** -0.0095*** 
 (-5.41) (-3.59) 
ROA -0.0405*** -0.0559*** 
 (-4.05) (-8.03) 
Loss 0.0002 -0.0092*** 
 (0.04) (-3.73) 
Intercept 0.1856*** 0.1982*** 
 (4.93) (4.77) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Sample size 132,909 132,916 





Table 5  
Equity market development and country-level aggregate earnings management 
 
This table presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the effect of FTR 
in language on earnings management aggregated at the country level and the effect of FTR in language on 
equity market development. Aggregate Earnings Management is from Leuz et al. (2003). It is calculated as 
the average ranks across four earnings management measures: (1) the median ratio of the firm-level 
standard deviations of operating income and operating cash flow, both scaled by lagged total assets; (2) the 
spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, both 
scaled by lagged total assets; (3) the median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value 
of the cash flow from operations; (4) the number of “small profits” divided by the number of “small losses” 
for each country. Anti-director Index from La Porta, et al. (1998) ranges from zero to five where a higher 
value indicates greater investor protection. Legal Enforcement is measured as the average score across three 
legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) an assessment of 
rule of law, and (3) the corruption index. All three variables range from zero to ten where a higher value 
denotes greater law enforcement. External CAP / GNP is a measure of equity market development from La 
Porta et al. (1997) and is calculated as a ratio of the stock market capitalization to gross national product. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by country. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dependent variable =  Aggregate Earnings Management  External CAP / GNP 
   
Weak FTR -7.1289** 0.2090** 
 (-2.87) (2.18) 
Anti-director Index -1.5587* 0.0622 
 (-2.10) (1.38) 
Enforcement 3.1664*** 0.0483* 
 (4.01) (1.90) 
Common Law -6.2336** 0.2043 
 (-2.74) (1.49) 
Owner Concentration 13.4392** -0.3161 
 (2.62) (-0.85) 
Creditor Rights 2.7444*** 0.0028 
 (4.02) (0.09) 
GDP Growth 13.2737 0.0223 
 (0.93) (0.84) 
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.0717* -0.0018 
 (2.00) (-0.82) 
Masculinity 0.1044** -0.0011 
 (2.55) (-0.55) 
Individualism -0.2387*** -0.0012 
 (-4.97) (-0.31) 
Power Distance -0.0218 0.0063** 
 (-0.61) (2.33) 
Intercept -7.6136 -0.2971 
 (-0.83) (-0.46) 
Sample size 28 38 





Table 6  
Analyses based on the birthplace information of U.S. firms’ CEOs.  
 
This table presents the results from pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the effect 
of FTR in language on earnings management based on the birthplace information of U.S. firms’ CEOs. 
Female is an indicator variable equal to one if a CEO is a female and zero, otherwise. Age is the age of 
CEO at the end of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are 
clustered by country of birth. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dependent variable = ABSDA ABSRCFO 
   
Weak FTR -0.0133** -0.0299** 
 (-2.19) (-2.25) 
Female -0.0013 0.0031 
 (-0.44) (0.92) 
Age -0.0003*** -0.0003 
 (-3.86) (-1.47) 
Size -0.0050*** -0.0035*** 
 (-13.53) (-4.74) 
Leverage 0.0059 -0.0226** 
 (0.70) (-2.22) 
CFO 0.0011 0.0061*** 
 (1.18) (5.30) 
ROA -0.0395*** -0.0448*** 
 (-12.64) (-11.54) 
Loss -0.0018 -0.0437*** 
 (-1.24) (-20.60) 
Intercept 0.0795*** 0.1710*** 
 (9.95) (12.78) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Sample size 4,781 4,812 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Additional controls for insider trading restrictions and compliance between financial 
and tax reporting, excluding Belgian and Singaporean firms  
 
 Dependent variable = ABSDA ABSRCFO 
   
Weak FTR -0.0198*** -0.0185** 
 (-2.91) (-2.16) 
Insider Trading Restriction 0.0095* 0.0243*** 
 (1.80) (3.91) 
Book-Tax Conformity -0.0215 -0.0566** 
 (-1.26) (-2.40) 
Other country-level controls Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Sample size 111,785 111,794 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.31 
 
 
Panel D: International exposure and the effect of FTR in language on earnings management, 
excluding Belgian and Singaporean firms 
 
 Dependent variable = ABSDA ABSRCFO 
   
Weak FTR -0.0251*** -0.0240*** 
 (-5.22) (-2.85) 
ADR 0.0033 0.0131** 
 (0.64) (2.46) 
Weak FTR*ADR 0.0117** 0.0129 
 (2.20) (1.54) 
Country-level controls Yes Yes 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Sample size 128,774 128,781 





Table 8  
Analyses based on signs of accrual-based and real earnings management  
 
This table presents the results from analyses based on different signs of discretionary accruals and abnormal 
cash flows from operations. Panel A reports the results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
with ABSDA and ABSRCFO as dependent variables. In Panel B, we estimate multinomial logistic 
regressions that test the likelihood that a firm might be in the extreme DA or RCFO quartiles as a function 
of Weak FTR. This specification considers simultaneously, but separately, the likelihood of positive and 
negative discretionary accruals (abnormal cash flows from operations). Firm year observations in the 
middle two quartiles are classified as the benchmark group. We estimate a model predicting the likelihood 
that a firm will be in the top quartile DA (RCFO) group and a model predicting the likelihood that a firm 
will be in the bottom quartile DA (RCFO) group. DA is discretionary accruals and RCFO is abnormal cash 
flows from operations. Other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by country. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Panel A: Subsample analysis 
 
Dependent variable = ABSDA ABSRCFO 
  DA > 0 DA < 0 RCFO < 0 RCFO > 0 
     
Weak FTR -0.0241*** -0.0144*** -0.0206*** -0.0190*** 
 (-4.20) (-4.03) (-3.31) (-2.94) 
Common Law -0.0112 -0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0022 
 (-1.06) (-0.16) (-0.21) (-0.17) 
Ownership Concentration -0.0437*** -0.0181* -0.0061 -0.0058 
 (-2.76) (-1.93) (-1.00) (-1.07) 
Creditor Right 0.0030 0.0016 0.0016 0.0004 
 (1.30) (0.94) (0.58) (0.11) 
GDP Growth 0.0473*** 0.0486** 0.0239 0.0314 
 (2.83) (2.37) (1.22) (1.38) 
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0005* -0.0003* -0.0005** -0.0004 
 (-1.94) (-1.70) (-1.98) (-1.44) 
Masculinity 0.0004*** 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002 
 (2.61) (1.82) (0.60) (1.09) 
Individualism -0.0009*** -0.0007*** -0.0004** -0.0007*** 
 (-4.66) (-5.75) (-2.32) (-3.34) 
Power Distance -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** 
 (-4.12) (-4.25) (-4.07) (-3.63) 
Size -0.0093*** -0.0058*** -0.0076*** -0.0108*** 
 (-4.55) (-5.59) (-4.66) (-4.04) 
Leverage 0.0741*** 0.0460*** 0.0586*** 0.0632*** 
 (14.80) (7.43) (3.89) (6.21) 
CFO -0.0074*** 0.0020** -0.0114*** 0.0032** 
 (-7.17) (2.32) (-6.55) (2.14) 
ROA -0.0561*** -0.0482*** -0.0734*** 0.0167 
 (-9.19) (-5.21) (-8.87) (1.43) 
Loss -0.0065** 0.0017 0.0190*** -0.0324*** 
 (-2.42) (0.39) (2.86) (-4.08) 
43 
 
Intercept 0.2101*** 0.1656*** 0.1209*** 0.2967*** 
 (5.07) (4.52) (3.40) (5.11) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 64,742 68,167 59,938 72,978 






Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Multinomial logistic regression results 
 
 Dependent variable = 












     
Weak FTR -0.5184*** -0.4513*** -0.5272*** -0.3040*** 
 (-5.13) (-3.22) (-3.67) (-2.78) 
Common Law 0.0145 -0.3456* -0.3085* 0.3142* 
 (0.09) (-1.67) (-1.75) (1.68) 
Ownership Concentration 0.1702 -0.5872 -0.0157 -0.1786** 
 (0.60) (-1.62) (-0.15) (-2.15) 
Creditor Right 0.0034 0.0832* 0.0535 -0.0408 
 (0.08) (1.83) (1.27) (-0.77) 
GDP Growth -0.0923 -2.4834* 0.6937** 0.9245* 
 (-0.09) (-1.95) (2.44) (1.84) 
Uncertainty Avoidance -0.0105** -0.0073 -0.0076* -0.0112** 
 (-2.37) (-1.57) (-1.70) (-2.07) 
Masculinity 0.0013 0.0048 -0.0021 -0.0049 
 (0.51) (1.39) (-0.65) (-1.59) 
Individualism -0.0146*** -0.0184*** -0.0128*** -0.0092** 
 (-4.49) (-4.68) (-4.09) (-2.43) 
Power Distance -0.0104*** -0.0110*** -0.0085*** -0.0163*** 
 (-3.81) (-3.67) (-3.79) (-5.13) 
Size -0.0728*** -0.1798*** -0.1083*** -0.1214*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.27) (-4.40) (-5.72) 
Leverage 0.5068*** 0.5851*** 0.5014*** 0.4519*** 
 (10.97) (4.49) (4.70) (7.55) 
CFO 0.0498* -0.1085*** -0.1303** 0.1691 
 (1.67) (-4.15) (-2.57) (0.56) 
ROA -0.8938*** -0.0970 -0.3725*** 0.8309 
 (-14.73) (-0.98) (-7.19) (0.98) 
Loss 0.0304 0.0679 0.8706*** -0.9676*** 
 (0.22) (0.69) (12.67) (-3.73) 
Intercept 1.6065 2.4083* 1.9147** 2.7650*** 
 (1.60) (1.77) (2.27) (3.93) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 132,909 132,916 








Table 9  
The effect of FTR language on timely recognition of economic losses 
 
This table presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the effect of FTR 
in language on the asymmetric timely recognition of economic losses. ∆NIt is change in net income from 
year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. ∆NIt-1 is change in net income from year t-2 
to year t-1 divided by total assets at the end of year t-2. D∆NIt-1 is 1 if ∆NIt-1 is negative and 0 otherwise. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix B. Standard errors are clustered by country. t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dependent variable = Predicted sign ∆NIt ∆NIt ∆NIt 
D∆NIt-1 ? -0.0089*** -0.0095*** 0.0556** 
  (-5.43) (-7.33) (1.98) 
∆NI t-1 0 -0.0582*** -0.0641*** 0.3955*** 
  (-7.72) (-6.97) (3.10) 
∆NI t-1*D∆NI t-1 - -0.5001*** -0.4643*** -0.4642 
  (-12.59) (-13.12) (-0.97) 
Weak FTR ?  -0.0059** -0.0079*** 
   (-2.25) (-2.90) 
Weak FTR*D∆NI t-1 ?  -0.0015 -0.0117* 
   (-0.35) (-1.95) 
Weak FTR*∆NI t-1 ?  0.0203 0.0231 
   (1.19) (0.55) 
Weak FTR*∆NI t-1*D∆NI t-1 -  -0.1780** -0.2918** 
   (-2.25) (-2.28) 
Size ?   0.0010** 
    (2.25) 
Size*D∆NI t-1 ?   -0.0019 
    (-1.56) 
Size*∆NI t-1 ?   -0.0240*** 
    (-3.25) 
Size*∆NI t-1*D∆NI t-1 ?   0.0613*** 
    (4.72) 
Country-level Controls  No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size  116,720 116,720 116,720 
Adjusted R-squared  0.08 0.08 0.09 
 
 
